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INSURANCE LAW-THE EXPOSURE THEORY VERSUS 
THE MANIFESTATION THEORY: WHICH METHOD 
SHOULD COURTS USE TO DETERMINE WHEN 
COVERAGE IS TRIGGERED UNDER A STANDARD 
COMPREHENSIVE FORM GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY? 
Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 324 Md. 
44, 595 A.2d 469 (1991). 
For insurance companies using standard form comprehensive 
general liability policies, asbestos-related injuries present peculiar 
problems. I Generally, under such policies, the insurer agrees to 
indemnify the insured for bodily injuries that occur during the policy 
coverage period and to defend the insured against lawsuits arising 
from the bodily injury.2 Indemnifying companies for lawsuits arising 
from exposure to asbestos products, however, is particularly complex 
because there is usually no temporal proximity between the initial 
exposure to the toxic material and the manifestation of the bodily 
injury.3 Accordingly, courts have experienced difficulty interpreting 
the scope of coverage under the standard form comprehensive liability 
policies. In Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. ,4 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted an "exposure approach" to 
determine that a bodily injury occurs when a person first inhales 
asbestos.5 While this approach places a great, and arguably unfair, 
1. A comprehensive general liability policy provides coverage for damages caused 
by bodily injury due to an occurrence. Typically, such policies state that the 
insurance company will pay, on behalf of its insured, all sums which the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages resulting from a 
bodily injury, to which the policy applies, caused by an occurrence. Such 
policies also state that the insurer will defend any suit against its insured as a 
result of the bodily injury. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 
F.2d 1034, 1055-57, (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (listing 
and comparing various provisions in policies from various insurance compa-
nies). 
2. Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(concluding that only when insurers establish as a matter of law that there is 
no possibility of coverage can they avoid their duty to defend and indemnify 
their insureds). 
3. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1545 (lith Cir. 
1985) (holding that the "exposure approach" is the superior interpretation for 
the contract provisions in general liability policies (citing Keene Corp., 667 
F.2d at 1040». 
4. 324 Md. 44, 595 A.2d 469 (1991). 
5. [d. at 62, 595 A.2d at 478. 
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burden on the insurance industry, it allows victims of asbestos-related 
diseases to be justly compensated for their injuries.6 
The Mitchell appeal arose from a motion for summary judgment 
granted in' favor of the insurer, Maryland Casualty Company ("Mar-
yland Casualty"). The court of appeals granted Mitchell's petition 
for a writ of certiorari prior to consideration of its appeal by the 
court of special appeals.' Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc., ("Mitchell") was 
a mechanical contractor that sold, distributed and installed products 
containing asbestos. For approximately twenty-two years, Maryland 
Casualty insured Mitchell under a series of standard form compre-
hensive liability policies. 8 Owing to the expiration of those policies, 
a number of plaintiffs sued Mitchell for personal injury damages 
arising from exposure to asbestos products used in Mitchell's busi-
ness. 9 Mitchell demanded that the insurer defend it against the 
lawsuits.1O The insurer refused on the ground that the policies did 
not cover the claims. 11 
The insurer contended that, under the series of policies, it would 
"provide coverage for bodily injuries caused by an occurrence and 
that an 'occurrence under an insurance policy is the date when the 
harm is first discovered.'" 12 Mitchell insisted, however, that the 
policies required the insurer to defend and indemnify against "all 
personal injury asbestos-related suits wherein the plaintiffs allegedly 
may have been exposed, during the policy period, to an asbestos 
product allegedly applied or supplied to Mitchell, regardless of when 
the alleged asbestos-related disease manifests itself." 13 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland interpreted the terms "bodily 
injury" and "occurrences" as they existed in the comprehensive 
6. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 
n.27 (6th Cir. 1980). Ordinarily the burden is on the insured to prove coverage. 
Under the exposure theory, however, the burden essentially shifts to the 
insurance company once an injured worker proves that while he was working 
for the insured company, he was exposed to asbestos products. Id. By dem-
onstrating exposure to asbestos products, the injured worker often raises the 
issue of joint and several liability among various insurance companies. The 
insurance companies which insured the employers or manufacturers have a 
difficult time proving whether or not exposure took place during specific policy 
periods because few insureds keep records for more than fifteen years. Also, 
a worker may have been exposed to asbestos products manufactured by several 
different companies which were most likely insured by different insurance 
agencies. "At best there will be vague testimony that manufacturer X's products 
were used at a certain job site during certain years." Id. 
7. Mitchell, 324 Md. at 50, 595 A.2d at 472. 
8. Id. at 46, 595 A.2d at 470. 
9. Id. at 47, 595 A.2d at 470. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 48, 595 A.2d at 471. 
13. Id. at 47, 595 A.2d at 470. 
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general liability policies by reviewing decisions in other jurisdictions, 14 
considering the plain meaning of the terms "bodily injury" and 
"occurrence," and studying the medical evidence concerning the 
development of asbestos-related diseasesY Ultimately, the court ac-
corded the disputed terms the meaning given to them by "the 
overwhelming weight of authority in the country,"16 and concluded 
that, at the very least, "coverage under the policy, is triggered upon 
exposure to the insured's asbestos products during the policy period 
by a person who suffers bodily injury as a result of that exposure." 17 
The court reviewed the medical reports and testimony of the 
expert witnesses from both parties. ls According to the appellant's 
pathologist's testimony, an injury may be defined as "the alteration 
of structure and/or function of cell, tissue or organ."19 The diseases 
that result from exposure to asbestos all involve injuries to the cells 
and tissues within the lungs. Similarly, the appellee's clinician's report 
established that the body may sustain substantial injury from expo-
sure to asbestos even though the injury does not necessarily progress 
14. The Mitchell court reviewed the decisions of other jurisdictions to reach its 
conclusion concerning the definitions of the terms "bodily injury" and "oc-
currence." C/. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 
1546 (lIth Cir. 1985) (holding injurious exposure theory properly applied in 
litigation arising out of asbestos-related injuries); American Home Prods. Corp. 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760, 764-65 (2d Cir. (984) (holding exposure 
alone cannot trigger coverage but injury-in-fact does not necessarily mean an 
injury that is "diagnosable" or "compensable"); Porter v. American Optical 
Corp., 641 F .2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981) (ruling insurance coverage should 
be pro-rated among all carriers for cumulative, progressive lung disease con-
tracted as a result of asbestos exposure), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); 
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (holding exposure theory is superior interpretation of the contract 
provisions in an insurance policy); Zurich Ins. Co. v. R'aymark Indus., 514 
N.E.2d 150, 161 (Ill. 1987) (adopting exposure theory and stating that bodily 
injury takes place at or shortly after exposure to asbestos); United States 
Fidelity & Ouar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1976) (property damage case concluding that "property damage" occurs 
to the entire structure in the policy period when the flaking of the defective 
bricks first becomes apparent). 
15. See Mitchell, 324 Md. at 63, 595 A.2d at 478. Appendix A and Appendix B 
attached to the Mitchell opinion contain the reports of the expert witnesses. 
16. [d. at 62, 595 A.2d at 478. 
17. [d. 
18. Both witnesses' reports define asbestosis as a disease which results from the 
inhalation of asbestos fibers. Dr. Epstein's report, however, suggests that the 
stages which precede the development of asbestosis do not constitute disease. 
Dr. Craighead's report, on the other hand, suggests that the term "bodily 
injury" includes the process of reaction and/or repair of injury. Mitchell, 324' 
Md. at 63-68, 595 A.2d at 478-81. 
19. [d. at 64, 595 A.2d at 479. 
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to "widespread pulmonary fibrosis" and therefore may never produce 
disease. 2o 
Determining when asbestos-related injuries trigger coverage under 
standard liability policies is problematic because of the latency of 
the injuries that result from exposure to asbestos21 and the ambiguous 
language used in the policies.22 Asbestos-related diseases begin when 
particles of asbestos are inhaled into the lungs. 23 Inhalation of 
asbestos particles usually occurs during the installation or handling 
of materials containing asbestos, or during the demolition of buildings 
constructed with asbestos products, because asbestos particles become 
airborne easily.24 The inhaled particles lodge in the lungs and, as 
more particles accumulate, fibrous tissues surround them to prevent 
further irritation within the lungs. 25 This encapsulating process is 
usually a beneficial bodily defense, but when the number of encap-
sulated particles becomes too great, ordinary pulmonary functions 
are inhibited, making breathing difficult. 26 Significant accumulation 
of asbestos particles is a lengthy process. Thus, asbestos-related 
diseases27 remain latent for along period of time, often for more 
than twenty years after the initial exposure. 
20. Id. at 68, 595 A.2d at 481. 
21. Id. at 68, 595 A.2d at 481. "It is only after a period of two decades or more 
of exposure to asbestos that individuals appear to lose the effectiveness of the 
counterbalancing anti-inflammation that asbestosis may develop." Id. 
22. One example of standard policy language is that cited in the Keene Corp. 
opinion: 
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
bodily injury ... to which this insurance applies, caused by an 
occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to defend 
any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such 
bodily injury . . . even if any of the allegations of the suit are 
groundless, false or fraudulent .... 
Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1039. As noted by the court, "[u]nfortunately, the 
insurance companies failed to develop policy language that would directly 
address the full complexity entailed by asbestos-related diseases." Id. at 1041. 
The standard liability policies fail to explain when a bodily injury occurs for 
the purpose of coverage in situations where the disease may not manifest itself 
for years. 




27. Asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer are all diseases related to exposure 
to asbestos. Asbestosis is a fibrous condition of the lungs which is caused by 
asbestos fibers reaching the alveoli. Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1038 n.3. "The 
seriousness of the disease in individual cases depends on the duration and 
intensity of inhalation and on individual idiosyncracy." Id. Mesothelioma, a 
malignant tumor of the lining of the lungs or the lining of the peritoneum, 
1992J Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. 171 
This latency period poses the first obstacle for courts. Inhalation, 
and, later, actual manifestation of disease, may occur over time and 
through numerous policy periods. Different insurers, therefore, are 
likely to be "on the risk" at different points during the development 
of each plaintiff's disease. 28 This makes it difficult to determine 
which insurer should bear the responsibility for indemnifying the 
defendant employer or manufacturer. 
The second obstacle for courts is the language used in the 
standard liability policies under which manufacturers or distributors 
of asbestos products are customarily insured. Under the standard 
policy, the insurer must indemnify the insured for all sums that "the 
insurer shall legally be obliged to pay as damages because of ... 
bodily injury ... caused by an occurrence. "29 
Usually, such standard policies define the term "bodily injury" 
as "sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during 
the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom."30 
"Occurrence" means "an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property 
damage neither expected or intended from the standpoint of the 
insured. "31 As a general rule, the time of an occurrence is not the 
time the wrongful act was committed but the time when the com-
which surrounds the organs of the gastrointestinal tract, can develop many 
years after initial inhalation ceases, and can manifest itself several months after 
it begins to develop. [d. It is well established that prolonged exposure to 
asbestos causes mesothelioma. [d. Lung cancer is also thought to be caused 
by prolonged inhalation of asbestos fibers. It too can develop and manifest 
itself long after the inhalation of asbestos ceases. [d. 
28. Here, the term "on the risk" refers to the risk of injury to the insured's 
employees that the insurer bears during the period of insurance coverage under 
the policy. In cases involving asbestos-related injuries, it is not known how 
little exposure is necessary to cause disease, and inhalation of asbestos fibers 
may occur over a long period of time. The Keene Corp. court considered these 
possibilities: 
[I)nhalation may continue through numerous policy periods, the dis-
ease may develop during subsequent policy periods, and manifestation 
may occur in yet another policy period. For an insured such as [a 
large asbestos manufacturing company), different insurers are likely 
to be on the risk at different points in the development of each 
plaintiff's disease. Moreover, part of the development may occur at 
a time when no insurer was on the risk .... Unfortunately, the 
insurance companies failed to develop policy language that would 
directly address the full complexity entailed by asbestos-related dis-
eases. 
Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1040-41. 
29. Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 121 (D.C. CiT. 1986). 
30. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th CiT. 
1985). 
31. Abex, 790 F.2d at 122. 
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plaining party was actually damaged.32 The issue of when the com-
plaining party was actually damaged is the essence of the problem. 
Traditionally, there are two approaches used to solve the problem 
of determining when a person suffers damage from exposure to 
asbestos, thereby triggering insurance coverage. Under the "exposure 
approach," an insurer's obligation to indemnify the insured arises 
when the asbestos causes real bodily injury during the policy period. 33 
Under the exposure approach, a claimant does not have to prove 
that the bodily injury was compensable or diagnosable during the 
policy period. Because the exposure approach defines an asbestos-
related condition as a series of continuing bodily injuries, all insurers 
which provide coverage from the time of the claimant's initial ex-
posure to the time when the disease manifests itself may be liable to 
defend and indemnify the insured company or manufacturer. 34 Under 
the exposure approach, therefore, the claimant only needs to establish 
that he was exposed to asbestos during the insurance policy in 
question. 3s 
32. Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 73 Md. App. 670, 681, 536 A.2d 120, 
125 (1988); see also Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1144 
(5th Cir. 1985) (characterizing the medical evidence as indicating that each 
inhalation of asbestos into the lungs constitutes a "bodily injury" within the 
meaning of the policy). In Appendix A of the Mitchell opinion, Dr. John E. 
Craighead describes "bodily injury" as including physical or chemical damage 
to cells, tissues and/or organs which may be detectable only on a microscopic 
or subclinical level. Doctor Craighead notes that such microscopic damage is 
still an injury even though the harmed individual may not discover the injury 
until some later point in time. Taking an opposing position, in Appendix B of 
the Mitchell opinion, Dr. Paul Epstein suggests that many individuals inhale 
asbestos fibers without ever contracting an asbestos-related disease. Doctor 
Epstein submits that the inhalation of asbestos fibers into the lungs results in 
an inflammatory process which is potentially damaging to the alveolar walls. 
Mitchell, 324 Md. at 63-68, 595 A.2d at 478-81. 
33. Cases discussing the court's adoption of the exposure approach to determine 
liability under standard insurance policies include Ducre v. Executive Officers 
of Halter Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1985); Commercial Union 
Insurance Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543 (lith Cir. 1985); Keene Corp. 
v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Porter 
v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Insurance Co. of 
North America v. Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). 
34. Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F .2d at 1217. 
35. Abex, 790 F.2d at 121. In Abex, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit adopted the exposure approach to determine when 
coverage under a general liability policy was triggered. The Abex court held 
that "insurers have an immediate duty to defend [the asbestos manufacturer] 
in its asbestos cases until [the insurers] present positive proof that no coverage 
is possible." Id. at 122. The court placed the burden of proving lack of 
coverage on the insurers, and stated that unless the insurers prove as a matter 
of law that there is no possibility of coverage, they have a duty to defend in 
all cases in which the complaint permits proof of facts establishing coverage. 
Id. 
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The "manifestation approach," on the other hand, focuses on 
the diagnosis of the disease. Under the manifestation approach, 
bodily injury does not occur until the disease is diagnosed. The date 
of manifestation is the date when the claimant knew or should have 
known he or she had asbestosis or an asbestos-related disease, or the 
date when the disease is medically diagnosed, whichever comes first. 36 
Under the manifestation approach, those insurance companies on the 
risk when the disease manifests itself must pay the resultant judgment 
of liability Y 
Because insurance companies have failed to develop policy lan-
guage· that directly addresses the full complexities encompassed by 
asbestos-related diseases, courts have had to choose between the 
exposure approach and the manifestation approach in determining 
when coverage is triggered.38 The advantages and disadvantages as-
sociated with both approaches complicate the decision-making proc-
ess. Proponents of the exposure approach maintain that the 
manifestation of the disease has nothing to do with the occurrence 
of the "bodily injurY,"39 and emphasize medical testimony establish-
ing that tissue damage occurs shortly after the initial inhalation of 
asbestos fibers.40 Exposure approach advocates characterize asbestos-
related diseases as a series of continuing injuries to the body which 
accumulate to cause disability or death.41 Thus, exposure approach 
proponents conclude that exposure to asbestos, rather than manifes-
tation of the disease, triggers coverage, because the damage or 
"bodily injury" occurs upon inhalation of the fibers.42 
36. Cases discussing the court's adoption of the manifestation approach include 
Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st 
Cir. 1982) (holding subclinical insults to the lungs caused by asbestos exposure 
do not cause "loss, pain, distress, or impairment," with respect to liability 
insurance coverage, until such "insults" are clinically diagnosed or manifest 
themselves as a disease or sickness), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983); Mraz 
v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(holding liability coverage for property damage resulting from toxic waste 
leakage is triggered when damage is discovered, not when the leakage first 
begins); Harford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jacobson, 73 Md. App. 670, 684, 
536 A.2d 120, 127 (1988) (concluding lead paint poisoning did not trigger 
coverage when exposure to lead paint and diagnosis of poisoning occurred 
before policy coverage was obtained). 
37. Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216. 
38. Id. at 1223. 
39. Id. at 1217. 
40. Id. The tissue damage worsens as the victim breathes in more and more fibers. 
Id. . 
41. Id. 
42. In Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., the district court relied on the medical testimony 
to support its position to adopt the exposure approach. The medical testimony 
showed that when an individual inhales asbestos, '''each tiny deposit of scar-
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On the other hand, advocates of the manifestation approach 
argue that a manifestation interpretation best serves the intent of the 
parties to treat cumulative disease cases the same as ordinary accident 
cases. 43 Any other interpretation would make meaningless the limits 
and deductibles contained in the various insurance policies.44 Pro-
ponents of the manifestation approach argue that, unlike the exposure 
approach, the manifestation approach reasonably allows the proper 
operation of the insurance industry's claims machinery and admin-
istration of lawsuits.45 
like tissue causes "injury" to a lung.'" Id. (quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am. 
v. Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1978)}. 
The court reasoned that each such injury is an "occurrence" for determining 
which coverage applies. Upholding the decision of the district court, the 
appellate court in Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., also held that it was bound to 
interpret ambiguities in insurance contracts strictly against the insurer and 
construe insurance policies broadly in order to promote coverage. Id. at 1219. 
43. Id. at 1218. 
44. Id. Those who advocate using a "manifestation approach" argue that an 
"exposure approach" allows an insured to stack liability coverage so that the 
insured ends up with more coverage than it actually purchased. Id. at 1226 
n.28. For example, usually companies hold several different insurance policies 
over time. Under the "exposure approach," each inhalation of asbestos is 
deemed to be a separate bodily injury or occurrence under the policy, and 
therefore, the insured may stack the various liability policies to produce 
coverage in excess of the aggregate limits of each actual individual policy. In 
Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., the district court recognized this problem and 
limited the liability of each insurer to :'the maximum amount 'per occurrence' 
provided by each policy." Id. Therefore, each insurer faced only liability for 
the maximum limit written during any applicable year of coverage. Id. 
45. Id. at 1218-19. Proponents of the manifestation approach also rely on health 
insurance cases in which courts have held that there is no coverage until a 
disease is diagnosable as such. Eagle-Picher Indus., 682 F.2d at 20 n.5. 
Manifestation approach advocates note that determining statute of limitations 
issues present additional problems for those jurisdictions that use the exposure 
approach. Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1220. For example, if 
bodily injury occurs shortly after inhalation of asbestos fibers, then there is 
an issue of when the statutory time period begins to run. Fairness suggests 
that the statute of limitations should run from the date the disease manifests 
itself; however, this confuses the exposure approach rationale that bodily injury 
occurs upon initial exposure to asbestos. The manifestation approach avoids 
problems concerning statutory time periods by suggesting that bodily injury 
occurs when the accumulation of asbestos in the lungs results in a diagnosable 
disease. Id. Several courts adopted a manifestation approach to determine 
liability coverage in other "disease" cases because problems with statutory time 
periods could be avoided. Cj. Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 
566, 570, 574-75 (3d Cir. 1976) (statutory time period began to run when 
claimant knew or reasonably should have known she had thrombophlebitis), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Roman v. A.H. Robbins Co., 518 F.2d 
970, 972 (5th Cir. 1975) (medical malpractice action by claimant, whose use 
of prescription drug caused allergic reaction resulting in blindness, was time-
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Although neither approach is flawless, most jurisdictions in the 
United States have adopted the exposure approach. 46 In Commercial 
Union Insurance Co. v. Sepco Corp., 47 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that asbestos-related in-
juries result from the inhalation of asbestos fibers.48 Further, the 
court stated that because the inhalation of asbestos fibers may only 
occur upon exposure to asbestos, equating exposure with bodily injury 
is the superior interpretation of the insurance policy provisions.49 
Similarly, in Insurance Co. oj North America v. Forty-eight 
Insulations, Inc., so the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held that all insurers of Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., during 
the time plaintiffs contracted the cumulative asbestos-related diseases, 
would be required to bear a pro-rated share of the costs of defending 
the manufacturer against the lawsuits. 51 The court of appeals con-
strued the insurance policies in favor of the insured and stated that 
"it would be unfair to the insured - and contrary to his expectations 
when he bought the insurance - to allow a hidden condition to 
defeat the coverage which he bought. "52 The court further stated 
that the exposure theory was preferable because bodily injury should 
be construed to include tissue damage which takes place upon in-
halation of asbestos.53 According to the court, that interpretation of 
bodily injury was "both a literal construction of the policy language 
and the language which maximizes coverage," and "the construction 
which ... best represents what the contracting parties intended. "54 
barred because action accrued when claimant first learned of injurious condi-
tion); R.1. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776, 786 (5th Cir. 
1963) (statutory time period for claim for cancerous injury resulting from 
lifetime of cigarette smoking begins to run at the time the cancer manifests 
itself). 
46. See Ducre v. Executive Officers of Halter Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976, 994 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (exposure theory used to determine liability for employee's injury 
resulting from silica dust); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 
F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (exposure theory used to determine liability 
for asbestos-related disease); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 
1145 (5th Cir. 1981) (exposure theory used to determine liability for cumulative, 
progressive lung disease); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-eight Insulations, 
Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (exposure theory used to determine liability 
for asbestos-related disease). 
47. 765 F.2d 1543 (lith Cir. 1985). 
48. Id. at 1546. 
49. !d. (citing Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1223). 
50. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). 
51. Id. at 1224-25. 
52. Id. at 1221-22. 
53. Id. at 1223. 
54. Id. 
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Interestingly, the court in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of 
North America55 rejected both the exposure and manifestation theo-
ries as inadequate. There, the court stated that the allocation of 
rights and obligations established by the insurance policies would be 
undermined if the court were to adopt either a manifestation or 
exposure approach as the sole trigger of coverage.56 The court con-
cluded that the initial inhalation of asbestos, the continued accu-
mulation of asbestos within the victim's lungs, and the manifestation 
of the disease all trigger coverage under the policiesY The court 
construed "bodily injury" to mean any part of the injurious process 
involving the manifestation of the asbestos-related disease. 58 The court 
held that each of Keene's insurers whose coverage was triggered was 
liable to indemnify Keene in subsequent lawsuits and it was up to 
Keene to choose which insurer would defend and indemnify it against 
the lawsuits. 59 
Although many jurisdictions use the exposure theory to deter-
mine when coverage is triggered, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, in 1986, and the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland, in 1988, in cases that did not involve asbestos-related 
injury, both adopted a manifestation approach to determine when 
coverage was triggered under a standard form general liability pol-
icy.60 Both courts considered the manifestation approach to be su-
perior to the exposure approach.61 
55. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
56. Id. at 1044-45. The court explained that if exposure to asbestos constituted a 
"bodily injury" under the policy and was the sole trigger for coverage, the 
"subsequent development of a disease would be characterized best as a con-
sequence of the injury" and no further coverage could be triggered. Id. For 
example, assume Company A had no insurance coverage in 1980, and in 1980, 
its employee was exposed to asbestos. In 1990, Company A purchases insurance 
from Insurer B, and in 1993, the employee exposed in 1980 is diagnosed with 
asbestosis. If exposure constitutes an injury and is the sole trigger for coverage, 
the injury would have occurred when Company A was uninsured. Thus, 
Company A would be directly liable to the employee. In Keene Corp., the 
court thought this would create inequities and, therefore, decided both exposure 
and manifestation of the disease triggers coverage. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1050. 
60. In Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986), 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the 
insurance company had no duty to defend or indemnify the chemical company 
in a government action following discovery of leakage of toxic waste and 
property damage because the discovery of the leakage occurred after the 
termination of coverage. The court rejected the argument that because the 
leakage occurred during the policy period the insurer should be liable to defend 
and indemnify the chemical company. Id. at 1328. 
In Harford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jacobson, 73 Md. App. 670, 536 
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In Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co., 62 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that, in hazardous 
waste burial cases, an "occurrence" is determined by the time at 
which property damage first manifests itself, and not the time when 
leakage first occurS.63 Thus, the term "occurrence" as it exists in the 
liability policy means the date of discovery, which mayor may not 
be the date when the buried waste initially contaminates the prop-
erty.64 
Similarly in Harford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jacobson,6s the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland adopted the manifestation 
theory, stating that "[t]he Courts consistently hold that the party 
was 'damaged' when the injuries first manifested themselves."66 The 
court of special appeals relied on the Fourth Circuit's decision in 
Mraz 'and emphasized the Fourth Circuit's opinion that "the better 
rule is that the occurrence is deemed to take place when the injuries 
first manifest themselves."67 The facts in Jacobson, however, distin-
guish it from Mraz and other cases involving exposure to toxic 
materials. In Jacobson, the victim's lead poisoning manifested itself 
in 1982, which was prior to the date when Jacobson, the insured 
landlord, obtained the liability insurance policy.68 Thus, regardless 
of which theory the court decided to adopt, Harford Mutual Insur-
ance could never have been liable to Jacobson because both the 
exposure and the manifestation occurred before it was on the risk. 
A.2d 120 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the 
insurer was not liable for the tenant's lead paint poisoning because the disease 
first manifested itself prior to the policy period. [d. at 680, 536 A.2d at 124-
25. The court rejected the argument that the insurer should be liable because 
the tenant's exposure to lead paint poisoning and her injuries persisted through 
the policy period. [d. at 677, 536 A.2d at 125. 
61. The Jacobson court stated that the general rule is that an injury occurs within 
the meaning of a liability policy, not when the wrongful act was committed, 
but when the party was actually damaged. According to the Jacobson court, 
other courts have traditionally interpreted the word "damaged" to mean when 
the injury manifests itself. 73 Md. App. at 681, 536 A.2d at 125 (citing United 
States Fidelity & Ouar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1976»; see also Jacobson, 73 Md. App. at 681 n.5, 536 A.2d at 125 
n.5. 
In Mraz, the court held that under the liability policy therein, an "occur-
rence" has taken place not when the leakage occurs but when the damage is 
discovered. 804 F.2d at 1328. 
62. 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986). 
63. [d. at 1328. 
64. [d. at 1325. 
65. 73 Md. App. 670, 536 A.2d 120 (1988). 
66. [d. at 681, 536 A.2d at 125. 
67. [d. at 682, 536 A.2d at 126. 
68. [d. at 684, 536 at 127. 
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Despite the prior decisions of the Fourth Circuit and the Court 
of Special Appeals of 'Maryland, in Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. 
Maryland Casualty CO.69 the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted 
Mitchell's petition for certiorari prior to consideration of the appeal 
by the intermediate appellate court. In Mitchell, the court addressed 
the issue of whether, under a comprehensive general liability insurance 
policy, coverage is triggered when the injured party is first exposed 
to asbestos materials or when the disease first manifests itself as 
clinically diagnosable. In reaching its decision that the trial court 
erred when it applied the manifestation theory of insurance coverage, 
the court relied on the medical testimony which demonstrated that, 
pathologically, damage to the injured part occurs upon exposure, 
even though the damage is not clinically diagnosable and the resulting 
disease may not manifest itself for many years thereafter. 70 
The court of appeals' decision in Mitchell departs from the 
findings in Mraz and Jacobson that the manifestation approach is 
superior to the exposure approach for interpreting the terms "bodily 
injury" and "occurrence" in a standard comprehensive general lia-
bility policy. The Mitchell decision, however, conforms with the 
decisions of the majority of jurisdictions in the country,11 and is not 
necessarily inconsistent with prior Maryland law. 72 
In Mitchell, the court gave substantial weight to the medical 
testimony, and to the fact that "with one exception, all courts which 
have decided the issue in the context of asbestos-related personal 
injuries" have adopted the exposure approach.73 With respect to the 
medical evidence and the overwhelming authority in other jurisdic-
tions,74 the court's adoption of the exposure approach regarding 
asbestos injuries is the more logical and more equitable choice. 
It is important to note that in Mitchell, even though the clini-
cian's report was introduced by Maryland Casualty and the pathol-
69. Mitchell, 324 Md. 44, 595 A.2d 469 (1991). 
70. [d. at 50-51, 595 A.2d at 472. 
71. See infra note 78. 
72. The court of special appeals stated in Jacobson that "'the time of occurrence 
of an accident within the meaning of an indemnity policy is not the time the 
wrongful act was committed but the time the complaining party was actually 
damaged.'" Jacobson, 73 Md. App. at 681, 536 A.2d at 125 (quoting United 
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1976». After hearing the testimony of the expert witnesses in the 
Mitchell case, the court of appeals concluded that an occurrence happens with 
exposure to asbestos products because every exposure results in some sort of 
injury to the lungs. 324 Md. at 62, 595 A.2d at 478. 
73. Mitchell, 324 Md. at 51, 595 A.2d 472. The one exception is alleged to be 
Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty Mutual Insur~nce Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 
1982). 
74. See infra note 78. 
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ogist's report was introduced by Mitchell, the two reports are not 
antithetical. Although both reports differ as to when asbestos-related 
injuries culminate into disease, they agree that initial inhalation of 
asbestos causes bodily injury.7s Moreover, according to the court in 
Keene, regardless of whether exposure to asbestos causes an imme-
diate and discrete injury, the fact that it is part of the injurious 
process is enough for it to constitute "injury" under the policies.76 
In addition, when determining whether injury resulting from 
exposure to lead triggered insurance coverage under the defendant's 
standard policy, the Jacobson court relied on the general rule that 
the time of occurrence of an accident, within the meaning of an 
indemnity policy, is not the time the wrongful act was committed, 
but the time when the complaining party was actually damaged. 77 
The Mitchell court properly followed this rule, because the medical 
testimony introduced by the parties and the medical testimony in 
other asbestos cases in other jurisdictions establish that a person 
exposed to asbestos suffers injury shortly after inhalation of asbestos 
fibers.78 
Not only is the exposure approach logical in terms of the medical 
evidence and principles of insurance law, but it is also a more 
equitable decision for the victim of asbestos exposure and for the 
insured manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products. The 
insured companies purchased liability policies with the expectation 
that coverage under the policies would be triggered for lawsuits 
involving asbestos-related diseases. 79 Additionally, most insured man-
75. 324 Md. at 61, 595 A.2d at 477. 
76. Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1043. 
77. Jacobson, 73 Md. App. at 684, 536 A.2d at 125. 
78. Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 127-29 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(injury need not be diagnosable or compensable to trigger coverage if the injury 
is proven to have existed within the policy period); Commercial Union Ins. 
Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (injury occurs upon 
initial exposure); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty MUL Ins., 748 F.2d 
760, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1984) (injury-in-fact can occur through exposure to 
asbestos); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (inhalation of asbestos fibers does cause injury), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 
(5th Cir.) (bodily injury results from exposure to asbestos), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1109 (1981). 
79. The suggestion has been made that because an insurance contract is a contract 
of adhesion, the following principle should apply to the construction of 
insurance policies: "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and 
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored 
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated 
those expectations." Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with 
Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). This principle was 
followed by the court in Keene Corp. See Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1042 n.12. 
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ufacturers cannot afford to defend themselves against numerous 
lawsuits, nor can they afford to compensate the numerous plaintiffs 
bringing the lawsuits. Under a manifestation approach, many victims 
of asbestos-related injuries would not be fairly compensated because 
manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products, without insur-
ance coverage, would be forced into bankruptcy. 80 Similarly, the 
ambiguities in the contracts are the fault of the insurer and not the 
insured. If the insurance companies had appreciated fully the extent 
of potential liability for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos, the 
terms in the insurance policy would reflect the added risk, thereby 
rendering moot the issue of when asbestos-related diseases trigger 
coverage.81 
The court of appeals' adoption of the exposure theory will 
obviously affect the way in which lower courts decide future cases 
involving asbestos-related injuries. The Mitchell decision will also, 
. no doubt, influence future decisions concerning latent injuries re-
sulting from exposure to other, similar toxic materials. Although the 
court of appeals in Mitchell expressed no view as to the correctness 
of the Mraz and Jacobson decisions in the context of the subject 
matter therein,82 but its adoption of the exposure approach has 
already motivated the adoption of the same approach when dealing 
with cases involving property damage resulting from the burial of 
toxic waste. 83 
80. Asbestos litigation has cost the U.S. economy at least $12 billion. Seventeen 
otherwise productive American companies have gone bankrupt defending and 
settling asbestos lawsuits. Thousands of jobs have been lost because asbestos 
litigation quickly exhausts financial resources and forces many companies into 
bankruptcy. For example, Keene Corporation received $400 million to pay 
claims arising from asbestos-related conditions. Currently, Keene has already 
paid out more than $450 million to settle and defend nearly 100,000 claims. 
"Keene does not have enough money to continue resolving its 98,000 pending 
claims one at a time, nor the new cases being filed at the rate of 2,000 per 
month." Asbestos Litigation: The Road to Bankruptcy, THE BALTIMORE SUN, 
Sept. 7, 1993, at 8A (letter to the editor from Stuart E. Rickerson, Vice 
President General Counsel, Keene Corporation). 
81. The exposure approach is consistent with the law involving insurance coverage 
of losses that begin during one policy period and continue to develop and 
manifest themselves in another policy period. For example, in Snapp v. State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 388P.2d 884 (Cal. 1964), the policy was issued on 
the plaintiff's house, which had been damaged due to movement of the land 
under the house. While the land was still unstable, the insurer tried to limit 
its liability to the amount of damages that had occurred prior to the date when 
the policy terminated. The court held that the insurer's liability was not limited 
in this manner, and that the insurer had to indemnify the policy holder until 
the movement of the land stopped. Id at 885; see also Harman v. American 
Casualty Co., 155 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (insurer cannot terminate 
property loss or fire protection while land remains unstable). 
82. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying discussion. 
83. See Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 327 Md. 418, 610 A.2d 286 
(1992). 
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Irr Harford County v. Harford Mutual Insurance CO.,84 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held "that 'manifestation f is not the 
sole trigger of coverage in environmental pollution cases[,] ... [and] 
that coverage under the policies may be triggered during the policy 
period at a time earlier than the discovery or manifestation of the 
damage. "85 Significantly, while remanding the case to the lower court, 
the court of appeals emphasized that the burden to show actual 
property damage occurred within the coverage of the policies still 
remained with the insured. 86 
In addition, although the court of appeals has yet to address 
whether exposure to lead paint triggers coverage under standard 
liability policies, the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland concluded in Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. American Empire 
Surplus Lines Insurance Co. ,87 that in lead poisoning cases "the 
transition from Mraz to Harford County demonstrates that exposure 
plus bodily injury (even if unmanifested) is now sufficient under 
Maryland law to trigger coverage. "88 
With respect to injuries involving exposure to asbestos, the 
insurance industry obviously should modify its standard liability 
policy in order to avoid future problems. As for the numerous 
asbestos lawsuits already pending or yet to be filed, perhaps there is 
a more equitable and logical approach with regard to determining 
coverage under the language of the standard liability insurance policy. 
As suggested in the dissenting opinion in Forty-eight Insulations, 
Inc.,89 perhaps a rule which arbitrarily draws the line for the time 
when an asbestos-related disease occurs under a standard liability 
policy should be employed. According to the dissent, this line should 
be drawn at ten years from the date of the initial exposure to asbestos 
and each additional exposure would be viewed as an additional 
compensable injury. Under this proposed solution, liability would be 
divided by length of the policy term among all the insurers whose 
policies were "(1) in force ten years beyond the initial exposure to 
any manufacturer's product and (2) also in force during a specific 
interval in which the victim was exposed to the insured's product. "90 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 294-95. 
86. Id. at 295. The court specifically stated the following: 
Id. 
We decide nothing more in this case than that Judge Fader was in 
error in limiting trigger of coverage to the time of manifestation or 
discovery of the property damage. It is for this reason, and no other, 
that we shall vacate the summary judgment in the insurer's favor and 
remand the matter for further proceedings. 
87. 811 F.2d 210 (D. Md. 1993). 
88. Id. at 215. 
89. See Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
90. 633 F.2d at 1231. 
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Accordingly, this ten year rule would likely relieve the insurance 
companies from liability for periods during which the disease is 
latent, as well as prevent insurance companies from defeating cov-
erage entirely or shifting losses unjustly to other insurance companies. 
At the very least, this rule represents a fairer compromise and better 
spreads losses arguably unforeseen by the insurance industry as a 
whole. 91 
With respect to medical evidence, principles of insurance law, 
and the clear weight of authority in other jurisdictions, the court of 
appeals' decision to adopt the exposure approach is both logical and 
equitable. The potential impact the decision will have in other areas 
of the law is uncertain, but the decision's impact on asbestos-related 
injuries in Maryland will be socially beneficial. Under the exposure 
approach, the expectations of the insureds are fulfilled and victims 
of asbestos injuries may be compensated more completely. Also, the 
decision provides an incentive for the insurance industry to modify 
its standard comprehensive general liability policies rather than to 
allow insurance companies to hide behind the self-created ambiguities 
in the policies. 
Julie Dameron Wright 
91. [d. at 1230. Other suggestions for coping with the unyielding flood of asbestos 
lawsuits include deferred trial dockets for those claimants who have been 
exposed to asbestos but who are not now sick, and court supervised attorney 
fees. Asbestos Litigation: The Road to Bankruptcy, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 
7, 1993, at 8A (letter to the editor from Stuart E. Rickerson, Vice President 
General Counsel, Keene Corporation). Deferring less urgent claims would help 
alleviate the overwhelming drain on the funds available for compensating 
victims of asbestos exposure. Similarly, supervising the amount of money that 
lawyers make from asbestos litigation would also result in more equitable 
compensation for asbestos victims. "Studies show that asbestos contingent-fee 
lawyers routinely make $1,000 to $5,000 per hour by taking 30 percent to 50 
percent of the recovery that is intended to compensate sick "people." [d. Still, 
another approach to the problem may be for Congress to pass asbestos 
compensation legislation to regulate asbestos litigation. [d. 
